"A Field made Glorious"

Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, is deemed by many to be the most sacred ground in the United States. Of all the locations associated with that area, Cemetery Hill is one of the most important, because not only did it shape the battle itself, the hill played a vital role in the subsequent history of Gettysburg National Military Park as well.

This is the story of that hill.

"The whole scene is grand and imposing. Broad fields, stretching away in the distance diversified by gentle undulations, and flanked by commanding heights, with contiguous valleys, affording a natural covered way for the movement of troops; deep forests, and sheltering groves, with streams of water; and beyond all, towering in the distance, clothed in azure blue, a picturesque mountain range completes a landscape of rare beauty and magnificent proportions........its hills, towering in stately majesty, its forests, enameled with verdure, its quaint old town, like a miniature city, nestled amid fields sparkling in the sunlight of heaven, give to it, aside from its historical associations, a halo of sublime grandeur.

"If the visitor to Gettysburg has but one hour at his command, Cemetery Hill would unquestionably be the place to spend it."

So wrote John B. Bachelder, the first historian of the battle, in his 1873 guidebook. Although many modern visitors may disagree with this statement, a case can be made that Bachelder was correct. This is particularly true when a thorough examination of Cemetery Hill and its relationship to the history of Gettysburg National Military Park is made. The events that transpired upon the hill's slopes during the battle and the subsequent development of the field in many ways dramatically shaped the park as we know it.

In the history of Cemetery Hill there were three major events that occurred upon this important elevation: its role during and its effect upon the final outcome of the battle, being chosen as a sacred burial ground for American war veterans, and as the site of the most momentous speech in American history. By examining these events and Cemetery Hill's influence upon them, we can better understand our perception of this ground as being among the most sacred in the country. In turn those perceptions begin to tell us much about ourselves and about our values as a nation.

Thus Adjt. Francis Walker recalled vividly the afternoon of July 1, 1863. The Battle of Gettysburg, which had started as a accidental clash between the lead elements of widely scattered Union and Confederate armies, had steadily grown into a full scale engagement. By 3:30 p.m., the conflict had raged for more than eight hours and the two Union corps that had been fighting west, northwest, and north of the town, the First and Eleventh, were overwhelmed and driven into Gettysburg. The situation in the narrow streets rapidly deteriorated into chaos; as one Confederate recalled:

"The Union troops driven into the town from different directions were wedged and jammed in the streets, and soon became a disorganized mass. Artillery and ambulances struggling to get through the tangled crowd added to the confusion."

As a result, more than 3,500 Union soldiers were taken prisoner by the advancing Confederates.

Indeed, it seemed as if the Army of the Potomac faced imminent disaster. A Northern officer on Cemetery Hill viewed the Union collapse with dread: "Wreak, disaster, disorder, almost the panic that precedes disorganization, defeat and retreat, were everywhere." To the victorious Southern troops, another Confederate victory seemed in the making. A North Carolinian recalled: "There was not an officer, not even a man, that did not expect that the war would be closed upon the hill that evening......"

The "Hill" that he referred to was, of course, Cemetery Hill. Located at the southern edge of town, it rose prominently to a 100-foot elevation. Named for the local Evergreen Cemetery, established in 1853 and located on its southern slopes, the hill was practically devoid of vegetation and dominated the surrounding landscape. Its most prominent landmark was the brick Evergreen Cemetery gate-house located along Baltimore Pike, a road running across the hill's northeast slope. From a military standpoint, it was during the Federal withdrawal on July 1 that Cemetery Hill became enormously significant.

Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, commander of the Eleventh Corp and ranking officer on the field, realized the significance of Cemetery Hill, even before the fighting commenced on July 1. He later recorded that the hill was "the only tenable position" for the defeated Union forces. Watching the chaos below, he knew the elevation could serve as a natural rallying point, buying the time needed to allow other elements of the Union army to reach the field. Reacting quickly, he began to reorganize the surviving portions of the retreating troops into a new battle line across the hill's northern face.

Soon after, Second Corp commander Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock, arrived on the field. Under orders from Maj. Gen. George Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac, Hancock had proceeded to Gettysburg to take command of the Northern forces there and to assess the overall the overall situation. Based upon Hancock's information, Meade could then decide if Gettysburg was indeed the place to offer battle.

Armed with this authority, Hancock performed his assignment superbly. Arriving at a critical time, he rapidly took measures that soon reversed the Union prospects. Adjutant Walker, a member of Hancock's staff, later described this change of fortune:

"Upon this field of wreck and disorder now appeared Hancock..... ....At once the doubtful halt on Cemetery Hill was transformed into the confident assumption of a new line of battle; the fearful stream down the Baltimore road was peremptorily stopped. Shattered regiments as they reached the hill were halted and reformed. On every hand men began to seek their regiments with alacrity; commanders rectified their lines and prepared for whatever might happen; ammunition was brought up.......at all points, commanding positions were occupied with the bravest show of force that could be made, with a view to deterring the enemy from attacking until the reinforcements, now rapidly approaching the field, should arrive."

Hancock, like Howard before him, had realized the importance of Cemetery Hill as soon as he and his staff reached its crest and "the panorama of Gettysburg lay unrolled before them." Working in conjunction, both officers had taken advantage of the hill's superior terrain features to rally the fugitives and establish a new line of battle, giving the Army of the Potomac renewed confidence and hope of ultimate success.

Roads leading to the rear were cleared for the approach of reinforcements, and other key positions, such as nearby Culp's Hill and McKnight's Knoll, and even Little Round Top were occupied. Most important, however, the Union high command took advantage of Cemetery Hill's elevation as a natural artillery platform. A Union artillery officer remembered:

From this high ground which dominated the town and the fields, in all directions.....there was an unobstructed view of rolling country open and accessible to the fire of our guns.

These guns immediately opened fire on the recently victorious Southern troops below.

The swiftly transpiring events were obvious to the Confederates, both officers and enlisted men alike. Lt. J. Warren of the 8th Louisiana Infantry wrote "the enemy was posted on Cemetery Hill. .....& had command of every place near town or around it---our position was a poor one and as we deployed we were subjected to a galling fire....." Lt. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, commander of the Second Corp, which was largely responsible for the Southern victory that afternoon, scanned this newly formed Union line from a safe distance and was able to give a more analytical assessment: "The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position known as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg and quickly showed a formidable front there." Gen. Robert E. Lee had by this time reached the field and from his vantage point near the Lutheran Seminary just west of town viewed this new Union line for the first time. He described it in his report as a "high range of hills," and later as a strong position,......upon two commanding elevations adjacent to each other, one......known as Cemetery Hill, immediately south of the town......" The Confederate attack that day was not renewed; the crisis for the Army of the Potomac was considerably diminished.

The Union high command's assessment of the situation agreed with Lee's observations. Hancock, in keeping Meade well-informed as ordered, described the position at Gettysburg as "a very strong one." With this and other information, the commanding general ordered the Union army to concentrate there.

This critical decision was in large part affected by the role Cemetery Hill had assumed. It had attracted the attention of the Union high command; it had served as a rallying point; and its formidable appearance had assisted in dissuading the Confederates from pushing their advance. Hancock and other Union officers, however, also saw the hill's more significant role in a continued struggle at Gettysburg. It would no longer be merely a rallying point; it now became a critical section of the new Union battle line.

Formed during the evening of July 1 and the morning of July 2, when it was completed the Union battle line was approximately three and a half miles in length and resembled the shape of a giant fishhook. The bend of the hook was formed by Cemetery Hill. Therefore, Cemetery Hill became a critical sector--the apex--of the line. It was a commanding eminence, an excellent artillery platform, and along with the rest of the line it made an excellent defensive position. General Howard called it "a remarkable position which.....contributed to the grand results of July 2 and 3." However if the hill fell to Confederate assaults, so too would the rest of the Union line.

Robert E. Lee, confident from his partial success on July 1 and wanting to keep the pressure on the Union army, decided he would take the offensive on July 2. He realized the importance of Cemetery Hill and planned accordingly. Deeming Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill too strong to assault frontally, Lee directed his primary effort against the Union left. Lt. Gen. James Longstreet's First Corp would execute this attack, the principal purpose of which, according to Lee, was to "drive in" the Union left, take "the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the "ridge." Against the Union right, Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, Lee ordered "a simultaneous demonstration......to be converted into a real attack should the opportunity offer."

Thus if successful, the capture of Cemetery Hill would be accomplished either from the rear, by direct assault, or by a combination of both.

Lee's discretionary orders were directed at General Ewell, positioned opposite those two heights on the Union right. As expected, Ewell began to devise a strategy to attack the Union right in case an opening presented itself. Although his official report is vague, Ewell's basic plan can be ascertained. With the three divisions at his disposal, he assigned one, Major Gen. Edward Johnson's to move against Culp's Hill, while the other two were ordered against Cemetery Hill. Maj. Gen. Robert Rhodes' division struck the western face of the hill, crushing the Union defenders between the two divisions.

If successful, the possible consequences would have been devastating to the Union army. First, the Baltimore Pike, a major supply line, communication route and main line of retreat for the Army of the Potomac, would be severed. By capturing Cemetery Hill, Ewell's troops would have taken the apex of the Union line, thus cutting the Army of the Potomac in two. At the least, Meade would be forced to abandon the field, a highly risky maneuver in the face of the enemy. Even worse, if Lee aggressively followed up such a victory, he might have the opportunity he was seeking: the chance to crush his enemy in one massive stroke.

Obviously Cemetery Hill had to remain in Union hands if a Union disaster were to be avoided. The responsibility of ensuring this outcome rested upon elements of the battered Eleventh Corp. Two brigades of Gen. Adelbert Ames' division, approximately 1,200 officers and men, along with 5 batteries of artillery totaling 23 guns, were positioned on or near East Cemetery Hill. Located on the western face of the hill were the Eleventh Corp divisions of Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr and Maj. Gen. Carl Schultz, with a combined strength of approximately 4,300. They were supported by more than thirty guns from seven batteries.

Despite their recent setback on July 1, these men realized the importance of their position with respect to the outcome of the battle. Lt. George Beck, Companies E and L, 1st New York Artillery, in a letter he wrote that morning, touched upon these thoughts:

"We were completely overwhelmed yesterday by superiority of numbers. Our army is now concentrating here, and I think the great battle, if not decivisive[sic] battle of the war, will be fought here. We are pretty tired, as you can imagine. But I presume we shall be kept engaged, till the battle is decided, one way or the other. Appearances look as if the issue of the war, the success or downfall of the rebellion, would be determined in this state."

Accordingly, preparations were taken as the men fortified their positions throughout the night of July 1 and into July 2. The freshly turned earth and lunettes ringing the artillery were apparent the next morning to the closest Confederates, one noting that the Union soldiers "had done wonders in fortifying." Another noted the hill "was crowned with strongly built fortifications, and bristling with a most formidable array of cannon." The southerners realized that to take the hill now would be extremely difficult.

Ewell's soldiers settled down to wait, perhaps knowing that the timing of their movement depended upon the principal Confederate effort against the Union left. Little did they realize what a long uncomfortable and frustrating wait it would be. Morning passed into afternoon and the men lay exposed to the humid summer conditions. Longstreet's attack, having run afoul would not be launched until approximately 3:30 p.m. Shortly after, Ewell ordered his "diversion" to begin. Lt. James Gardner, Company B, 1st Pennsylvania Artillery, remembered: "At 4 p.m. the terrible crash of the enemy's artillery came."

Ewell planned an intense artillery bombardment against both Culp's Hill and Cemetery Hill as his diversion. His artillery, totaling thirty-two guns, opened on Cemetery Hill from the east and northwest. At first this fire was effective. Lieutenant Gardner recalled:

"The shots of the enemy came thick and fast, bursting, crushing and ploughing[sic], a mighty storm of iron hail, a most determined and terrible effort to cripple and destroy the guns upon the hill. Situated as we were in the center of this artillery line, our battery received the full force of the enemy's front, oblique and flank fire."

A Union correspondent near Evergreen Cemetery described the destructiveness of the Confederate fire:

"Then came a storm of shot and shell; marble slabs were broken, iron fences shattered, horses disemboweled. The air was full of wild, hideous noises--the low buzz of round shot, the whizzing of elongated balls and the stunning explosion of shells overhead and all around."

The Union artillery soon replied in a raging duel for supremacy. With more than fifty guns now placed in better positions, the Union batteries slowly gained an advantage. This cannonade continued for nearly two hours, until by approximately 6 p.m. the Confederate artillery had been smothered and forced to retire."

All this time, of course, Longstreet's First Corp was smashing into the Union left flank, Little Round Top, Devil's Den, the Wheatfield, and the Peach Orchard. General Meade, rightly concerned about his left, sought any means to bolster it. He had directed the Fifth Corp, his only reserve, and elements of other Corp, to move in that direction. Sometime near 6 p.m. most of the Twelfth Corp holding Culp's Hill was also ordered to reinforce the left, leaving vital terrain lightly defended.

At this juncture, Richard Ewell faced an important decision; should he convert his "diversion" into a full fledged assault? Despite the fact that his bombardment had obviously failed and that the Union line was still strong, he ordered his divisions forward around 7:15 p.m.

The plan was simple. Once Johnson's division engaged the Union troops on Culp's Hill, the next two division's in line, Early's and Rhodes', would advance in succession against Cemetery Hill. Thus the timing of the advance of Early and Rhodes depended upon when Johnson engaged the enemy. This would lead to a major problem for the last two divisions, especially Early's troops. Because Johnson's men faced numerous and unexpected obstacles in their advance, they did not strike the Union defenders on Culp's Hill until nearly 8 p.m. Thus it was already dusk when Early's division finally started forward. This lack of daylight, along with the obvious obstacles, such as the natural strength of the hill and the Union defensive line positioned upon it, made a successful assault on East Cemetery Hill seem nearly impossible. Lt. J. Jackson, Company I, 8th Louisiana, wrote: "I felt as if my doom was sealed, and it was with great reluctance that I started .....forward."

Early advanced with two of his four brigades, Brig. Gen. Harry Hays' "Louisiana Tigers," and Col. Issac Avery's North Carolina brigade, a force totaling approximately 2,550 officers and men. Early held Brig. Gen. John B. Gordon's Georgia brigade in reserve, to be used to exploit any breakthrough.

Tension had naturally mounted in the Confederate ranks throughout their long and anxious fifteen-hour wait. Suddenly the men realized their waiting was about to end as "couriers and aides were seen riding rapidly from one commanding officer to another. ....." Capt. Neill Ray, Company D, 6th North Carolina, later wrote: "We knew what that meant.......Never can that time be forgotten. Every man in the line knew what was before him." Despite this, another officer remembered that on "every face was most legibly written the firm determination to do or die."

Early's assaulting brigades, Hays on the right and Avery on the left, were positioned on the southern outskirts of the town under cover of a small ravine created by Winebrenner's Run. Capt. William Seymour, aide to General Hays, later recalled the beginning of the advance:

"At the word, up spring our men, and away they rush over the little ridge behind which they had so long laid, and down into the Valley which separated it from the dreaded 'Cemetery Hill.'"

Both brigades initially moved straight ahead, crossing over the ridge and into the open. Almost immediately Union troops spotted this movement and rapidly responded. The 5th Maine Battery on McKnight's Knoll opened first, as Lt. Edward Whittier recalled:

.....at once there was the flash and roar of our six guns, the rush of the projectiles, and along the front of the enemy's charging line every case shot.....burst as if on measured ground, at the right time and in the right place above and in front of their advance."

The Union batteries on the crest of East Cemetery Hill, now alerted, also opened. Lt. Whittier later wrote that these batteries " made the ground tremble with their volleys" as their shot and shell began "plowing through the lines of the enemy. . "

Along the Confederate line this fire was instantly felt, as General Hays reported:

"I had gone but a short distance when my whole line became exposed to a most terrific fire from the enemy's batteries from the entire range of hills in front, and to the right and left."

Despite this fire, Hay's and Avery's brigades continued their advance. A Louisiana soldier wrote, "Hays shouted 'forward' and on we went, over fences, ditches, thru marshy fields....."

The determination of the common Confederate soldier was easily evident in this assault. Despite the heavy damage inflicted upon them and the many obstacles that impeded their movement, the Southern line not only maintained its steady advance, but also completed a complicated maneuver in the process. In order to strike East Cemetery Hill from their jumping-off point, the Confederate line made a change of front, or "right wheel" during its advance. This was especially true for Avery's brigade, being on the far left and having the greatest distance to travel. Overcoming all the difficulties they encountered, the line completed the maneuver flawlessly. It was "a movement which none but the steadiest of veterans could have executed," claimed a North Carolina officer.

This maneuver, while successful, also exposed the left of Avery's line to a devastating flanking fire from the 5th Maine Battery. Lieutenant Whittier later wrote that his battery began:

".....with double canister, pouring a most destructive, enfilading, demoralizing, fire into a confused mass of the enemy, struggling in the uncertain shadows at the base of the hill."

By this time the situation was one of wild confusion as the Confederate line valiantly struggled onward. Col. Adin Underwood, commander of the 33rd Massachusetts, positioned at the base of the hill, recalled:

"The darkness is lighted up with the flames from the cannons' mouths, that seem to pour down in streams onto them. The roar and shriek of the shot and shell that plough through and through their ranks, is appalling. The gaps bravely close up and still they advance. Canister cannot check them."

The situation rapidly deteriorated as the Union musketry fire opened upon the Southern ranks. Underwood wrote:

"They near fifty yards, when a rapid and awful fire is poured into them.....until there are almost as many on the ground as in their lines."

Somehow Hay's and Avery's men rallied from this onslaught and continued their assault. Although they faced many obstacles, Early's brigades used several factors to their advantage. These factors, along with the determination and bravery of the Confederate soldiers, led to a spiral collapse of the Union line. The first of these advantages, the steepness of East Cemetery Hill. While seemingly a tremendous obstacle, the hill proved to be a weakness for the Union batteries at its crest, for the sharp slope prevented them from firing into the area directly in their front. Upon reaching the base of the hill, the Confederate ranks were literally under the muzzles of the Union artillery.

Ironically the growing darkness also assisted Early's men. Hays reported that:

".....owing to the darkness of the evening, now verging into night, and the deep obscurity afforded by the smoke of the firing, our exact locality could not be discovered by the enemy's gunners, and we thus escaped what in full light of day could have been nothing else than horriffic slaughter."

Lastly, the confusion created by the darkness, thick smoke and heavy fire unnerved some of the Eleventh Corp troops steeling themselves for this attack. Out of nowhere Hay's and Avery's brigades suddenly loomed. Col. Andrew Harris, commander of the Eleventh Corp brigade holding the north face of the hill, recalled the violent Confederate assault:

"It was a complete surprise to us. We did not expect this assault as bravely and rapidly made. In fact, we did not expect any assault. We would not have been much more surprised if the moving column had raised up out of the ground among the wavering Timothy grass of the meadow."

Hay's Louisianians struck hard, followed shortly by Avery's North Carolinians. Portions of the Union line fought stubbornly. Colonel Harris wrote: ".....all along my whole line the fighting obstinate and bloody. The bayonet, club musket, and anything in fact that could be made available was used." During this melee part of Hays' line surged through a gap in the Union line created by a last minute movement of troops. At this point the Union line was doomed. Through pockets of resistance clung to the base of the hill, most of the Eleventh Corp regiments retreated, some in disorder, up the hill. Following closely on their heels, Hay's "Louisiana Tigers" and parts of Avery's brigade charged up the steep slope "with heroic determination."

Their objective was the now exposed batteries at the crest. The situation for these artilleymen was probably alarming. Along with the deepening darkness and tremendous din of battle, the smoke was "so thick you could not see ten yards ahead." Then suddenly Union infantry "commenced running in the greatest confusion to the rear," in many cases passing between the guns. Captain Bruce Ricketts, commanding Companies F and G, 1st Pennsylvania Light Artillery, claimed that these men were "so panic stricken.....that several ran into the cannister fire of my guns."

Rushing to the crest, Hays' men reached Company I, 1st New York Artillery, commanded by Capt. Michael Weidrich. The New Yorkers stood to their guns; as one officer described the fight that followed:

"....the officers and men instantly began to fight to save their guns, using everything that they could lay their hands upon. They could no longer fire their guns as the enemy was in the battery. They seized the rammers, handspikes, fence rails, threw shot...and the officers used their sabres and pistols with remarkable activity and energy."

As the struggle for Weidrich's guns continued, the Confederates also reached Capt. Ricketts' battery, just to the right. As both Louisiana and North Carolina troops entered the battery, a similar hand-to-hand conflict with "handspikes, rammers, stones and pistols" ensued. Ricketts' claimed "Many men behaved splendidly in this great emergency." Maj. Samuel Tate of the 6th North Carolina reported: "The enemy stood with a tenacity never before displayed by them." Lt. Charles Brockway, of the battery, best described this desperate conflict:

"The scene was now one of the wildest confusion. Friends and foes were indiscriminately mixed, and our brave men, though outnumbered and without arms, by means of handspikes, rammers, stones, etc., made a sturdy resistance, animating each other with shouts and cries, "to conquer on the soil of our native State, or perish."

Maj. James Beall, 21st North Carolina, summed up the struggle by writing:

"The hour was one of horror. Amid the incessant roar of cannon, the din of musketry, and the glare of bursting shells making the darkness intermittent--adding awfulness to the scene--the hoarse shouts of friend and foe, the piteous cries of wounded and dying, one could well.....that 'war is hell'."

At this point, portions of East Cemetery Hill were in Confederate hands. "We supposed that we had won the battle," claimed Capt. Neil Ray of the 6th North Carolina, feeling they had "possession of....the key to Meade's position." To secure the Confederates' hard won gains, they also expected reinforcements from both Rhodes' division, to the right and front, and from Gordon's brigade from the rear. Ray recalled: "No one who has ever been in a similar position can understand how anxiously we looked for reinforcements."

Unknown to them, however, was the fact that no reinforcements were coming. Rhodes' attack against the northwest and west face of Cemetery Hill had broken down almost as soon as it had started. As a result, General Early had held back Gordon's brigade. Hays' and Avery's brigades were alone.

At this same time the Union high command had acted swiftly to repair the breakthrough. Both Second Corp and Eleventh Corp troops from the other side of Cemetery Hill rushed to the threatened area and launched counterattacks. Within a short time the batteries were recaptured and Early's infantry had been forced back down the hill. The struggle for East Cemetery Hill had all but ended, and so too had the crisis for the Union army.

Although they could take satisfaction in having held the vital terrain of Cemetery Hill, the Union soldiers defending its slopes realized that the battle was far from over. The attitude was probably summed up best by Lieutenant Whittier of the 5th Maine Battery:

"The fall of night found the Potomac army in a situation that demanded the most grave and serious consideration. We had repulsed the last assaults, but nearly twelve thousand men had fallen in a desperate battle.....It was indeed a gloomy hour....Men took position in silence, for the exultation of victory was not felt to cause them to forget fatigue, hunger, suffering comrades, or the chance of death on the coming day...."

The twilight shrouded a field hard fought, dearly won, barely held, drenched with blood; and upon tokens presaging evil to the Potomac army."

Robert E. Lee, determined to continue the battle and seeking a crushing victory over the Army of the Potomac, decided the next morning to launch what is popularly known as "Pickett's Charge."

Stated simply, the plan called for a devastating artillery bombardment to strike the center of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge, followed by a massed infantry assault.

While the most famous fighting of the assault occurred at the "High Water Mark" area, essentially most of the Union line was involved, including Cemetery Hill. The hill's principal impact on July 3 was as an artillery platform for the Union batteries placed upon its western slopes. Although this side of the hill was not as physically imposing as East Cemetery Hill, the unobstructed view afforded from this location made it an excellent artillery platform. Major Thomas Osborn, commander of the Eleventh Corp artillery, wrote that his batteries:

"....faced the west, commanding the plain and the low hills beyond....we commanded the plain perfectly, with no timber intervening, over which [any of] the enemy's infantry must advance to the charge."

Osborn had a total of eight full or partial batteries, totaling thirty-six guns positioned along the hill's west or north-western faces. The importance of the hill did not escape the Confederates as they made preparations for the grand cannonade. Osborn noticed these Confederate batteries and realized the vulnerability of his own guns, located as they were along Cemetery Hill's exposed crest:

"We were in plain view of the batteries of the enemy on at least a mile and a half of his line. The slope of the hill in our rear was too steep to use as cover for the guns or even the caissons. The distance of the enemy's guns from us was from three-fourths of a mile to a mile and a half. An excellent range, the country all open, no woods intervening between the line or between the enemy's batteries and Cemetery Hill. We made the best target for artillery practice the enemy had during the war."

Not only was the lack of cover a concern, but also the shape of the Confederate line gave the Confederate gunners the advantage of converging fire, allowing them to concentrate "upon a single point." Although most of the Confederate artillery fire would be aimed at the center of the Union line, more than fifty Confederate cannons were assigned to silence the Union batteries on Cemetery Hill. Despite these obvious disadvantages, Osborn prepared his batteries accordingly and the men then settled down to wait.

Shortly after 1 p.m. the Confederate artillery opened. General Howard later described the beginning of this immense bombardment:

"The signal gun was fired by the enemy, and from the southwest, west, north and northeast, his batteries opened, hurling into the Cemetery grounds, missiles of every description. Shells burst in the air, on the ground, at our right and left, and in front, killing men and horses, exploding caissons, over turning tombstones and smashing fences."

Major James Biddle, a member of General Meade's staff, recalled the fury of this fire:

"The artillery duel, which lasted an hour and a half, was the most severe of any experienced anywhere in the war. The air was filled with bursting shell and solid shot, and the very earth shook with resounding cannon."

Osborn's batteries faced a tremendous amount of the Confederate cannonade:

"Nothing which can be written will convey to the non-military man the slightest idea of the fire concentrated on Cemetery Hill during the hour and a half it continued. The shells must have reached us at a rate of one hundred and upwards, a minute at the least....The enemy turned their attention exclusively to the batteries on the crest of the hill....The officers, men and horses were killed and wounded rapidly. A caisson was blown up every few minutes, and now and then an artillery carriage was struck and knocked to pieces."

Then Osborn concisely summed up the situation by writing, "The enemy was now doing us a good deal of damage...." The Union high command, still realizing the importance of the hill, grew concerned. Osborn recalled:

"While the fire was at its greatest severity General Meade, accompanied by a staff officer, came on the hill and asked me if we could stay. I assured him we would do so. He said the result of the right depended on our holding the hill. I replied that the enemy also seemed to have the same idea...."

Osborn would later proudly claim, "The men showed no signs of demoralization." In his official report the Eleventh Corp officer went even further, writing:

"Our artillery endured this fire....coolness and determination. No battery even showed a disposition to retire....Our guns were worked with great coolness, energy, and judgement...."

Eventually the cannonade slackened and "a singularly depressing quiet covered the entire field." The wait for Confederate activity was a short one, for in just a "few moments." Osborn remembered, "the infantry of the enemy broke over the crest" of Seminary Ridge. Three southern divisions, numbering approximately 12,000 to 13,000 men, appeared from the Confederate positions and formed for this grand assault. General Howard called it "an extensive parade; the flags were flying and the lines steadily advancing...."

The advantages the Union batteries on Cemetery Hill held were obvious. Osborn stated: "The enemy's lines of battle were now in plain view, no trees or other obstructions intervening." He was quick to open on the Confederate ranks. "So soon as the enemy's first line of battle had fully developed....over the ridge," he wrote, "I ordered all the batteries...to open on it...." The results were devastating:

"Each solid shot...which struck either line cut out two men, but when a shell exploded immediately in front of either line it cut out four, six, eight or even more men, making a wide open gap in their line. These gaps and the width of them could be as distinctly seen from the hill as if we had been close to them."

Most of the Union batteries on Cemetery Hill concentrated their fire on the left flank of the Confederate column, the divisions of Brig. Issac R. Trimble. Brig. Gen. James H. Lane of Trimble's division called the artillery fire "murderous," while Brig. Gen. Joseph Davis of Pettigrew's command reported this fire "told sadly upon our ranks." A North Carolina soldier best described the scene:

"Solid shot ploughed through their ranks, spherical case rattled in their midst and.... swept them by the hundreds from the field....It was an awful experience to pass nearly a mile across an open plain subjected to such a terrible fire, with no hope of protection and without the power to resist."

Osborn reported "the havoc produced upon the ranks was truly surprising." The severe damage inflicted by the artillery upon Col. J.M. Brockenbrough's brigade, positioned on the extreme left of the assaulting Confederate column, along with flanking fire inflicted by the 8th Ohio, caused that command to break long before it reached the Emmitsburg Road."

As the Confederate advance continued, it eventually reached and crossed the Emmitsburg Road. Here, Osborn remembered, the Confederate ranks were "covered by the intervening ground from the guns on Cemetery Hill." The Union batteries on the hill fell silent as the final assault was made and repulsed at the "High Water Mark" area. With the failure of the Pickett-Pettigrew- Trimble Charge, the battle effectively ended. Rightfully proud of his men, Osborn stated in his official report: "I am convinced that the fire from the hill was one of the main auxiliaries in breaking the force of this grand charge."

The Army of the Potomac had achieved a great victory at Gettysburg. Cemetery Hill had played a significant role during all three days of the battle. On July 1 it served as a ralling point for the defeated First and Eleventh Corp and it became a determining factor in choosing Gettysburg as the battlefield. On July 2 and 3 the hill became the vital terrain feature in the Union army's defensive line, the apex of the "fishhook" line that protected the Baltimore Pike and provided the Union army with an excellent artillery platform. In turn, Cemetery Hill significantly influenced the fighting that followed, not only by influencing the Confederate battle strategy but also by being instrumental in repelling Confederate assaults on both July 2 and July 3. Brig. Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr, who commanded an Eleventh Corp division, stated in his official report:

"Cemetery Hill is the commanding point of the whole position, and its occupation by our troops had a decisive influence on the further progress and final result of the battle."

Although the battle had been won and the Union saved, the cost had been extremely high. Not only were casualties enormous-- nearly 51,000 were killed, wounded or missing--but also in the amount of physical damage as well. Adams county properties, to say nothing of the lives of the civilians who resided there, were shattered. Cemetery Hill itself was a perfect example; one eyewitness recalled its condition after the battle had ended:

"The cemetery was all shot to pieces. Monuments, gravestones and the iron fence that had surrounded it all lay in fragments and were jumbled together."

The rebuilding and recovery efforts would be slow and painful. Once again, Cemetery Hill would play a pivotal role during this next phase.

The immediate concern of the survivors were the more than 7,000 dead and approximately 30,000 wounded. The disaster was overwhelming and the obstacles blocking recovery were seemingly endless. Many of the solutions, therefore, were short term ones. The dead were initially buried in shallow graves on the battlefield. The wounded were crowded into "field hospitals" located in both private and public buildings across the county. Pennsylvania Governor Andrew G. Curtin visited the area about one week after the fighting. His principal concern was for the local community and for wounded Pennsylvania soldiers. During his visit, however, he was confronted by the deteriorating battlefield graves of the Northern dead. One eyewitness described:

"Our dead are lying on the fields unburied....with small portions of earth dug up alongside of the body and thrown over it. In many instances arms and legs and sometimes heads protrude and my attention has been directed to several places where the hogs were actually rooting out the bodies and devouring them.....Humanity calls on us to take measures to remedy this....."

Curtin's first solution was to have the remains of the Pennsylvania dead located and shipped to their respective homes. To assist this undertaking Curtin decided that the state government would pay the expenses, the only state to do so. To facilitate this effort the governor appointed Gettysburg attorney David Wills as his state agent.

However, the graves were deteriorating too rapidly for this solution to be successful. Curtin's plan only disposed of the Pennsylvania dead, leaving the other Northern states to fend for themselves. Accordingly, on July 23 or 24, Wills called a meeting of all the Northern state agents. There they discussed options for solving the various problems. From this meeting the idea for a Soldiers' National Cemetery emerged. A separate for all the Union dead, created and financed by the Northern states would be established.

It was decided that David Wills would supervise the project, and his duties included making all the financial arrangements, purchasing the land for the cemetery grounds, determining the reburial methods, creating a permanent committee for perpetual care of the cemetery , and hiring a surveyor and landscape architect. In a letter to Governor Curtin dated July 24, Wills described what he envisioned as the best location for a common burial ground:

"There is one spot very desirable for this purpose. It is the elevated piece of ground on the Baltimore Turnpike opposite the Cemetery. It is the place where our army had about 40 pieces of artillery in action all Thursday & Friday and for their protection had thrown up earthworks for the artillerists. It is the point on which the desperate attack was made by the Louisiana Brigades on Thursday evening when they succeeded in reaching the guns, taking possession of them and were finally driven back by the infantry assisted by the artillery men with their handspikes and rammers. It was the key to the whole line of our defenses,-- the apex of the triangular line of battle. It is the spot, above all others, for the honorable burial of the dead who have fallen on these fields."

The ground Wills was referring to was eight acres located on East Cemetery Hill. Once again the hill would be a focal point of attention.

Wills was not the only Gettysburg citizen who had this idea. Shortly after the arrival of Wills' letter, the governor received another letter from David McConaughy, a Gettysburg lawyer and the president of the Evergreen Cemetery Association. The letters contents were probably shocking:

"I have purchased & now hold all the land upon Cemetery Hill which encircles the Evergreen Cemetery Grounds, & which was occupied by the artillery and forces on the centre of our line of battle, on the ever memorable 1st 2d &3d of July inst."

Not only had McConaughy purchased the land Wills wanted, McConaughy also stated that he had already buried the remains of nearly one hundred Union dead in Evergreen Cemetery.

When Wills found out about McConaughy's actions, he accused McConaughy of being a "speculator", for Wills felt this rival attorney had overstepped his authority. Wills also realized that McConaughy's ideas would change the very nature of the project. McConaughy's plan would be of local influence instead of a cemetery of national character, as Wills and his fellow state agents had envisioned. This situation obviously presented a problem if the Soldier's National Cemetery were to become a reality.

David McConaughy's plan, however, was more than just an attempt to increase the importance of the Evergreen Cemetery. Besides purchasing the acreage on Cemetery Hill, he had also secured land on Culp's Hill, McKnight's Knoll, and Little Round Top. All of this was done at his own expense. On August 19, McConaughy publicly announced his ultimate objective, which was both revolutionary and visionary:

"Immediately after the battle of Gettysburg, the thought occurred to me that there could be no more fitting and expressive memorial of the heroic valor and signal triumphs of our army, on the first, second and third days of July, 1863, than the battlefield itself, with its natural and artificial defenses, preserved and perpetuated in the exact form and condition they presented during the battle."

The idea of preserving the battlefield itself as a memorial was unheard of at the time. Amazingly, he had initiated this task less than a month after the battle.

In 1864 McConaughy's actions would lead to the establishment of the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association and eventually to the formation of Gettysburg National Military Park. Once again, Cemetery Hill was at the forefront of this movement, for the first acreage McConaughy purchased to implement his plan was on part of the hill. Although hindsight reveals to the modern reader how visionary McConaughy's actions were, to David Wills they were a major setback in establishing a cemetery of "National character."

After three more weeks of negotiations and political maneuvering, Wills was able to purchase seventeen acres of land on Cemetery Hill from the Evergreen Cemetery Association, thus avoiding any direct dealings with McConaughy. It was not the ground Wills had originally intended to buy on East Cemetery Hill, but rather land on the north and west slopes of the hill.

Despite many difficulties, the project had already taken on a higher meaning. Wills referred to the undertaking as a "sacred project," a "noble project," "sacred work," with a "special purpose." The Evergreen Cemetery Board called it a "nobel enterprise" and "a grand national enterprise." The perception of the very ground also took on special significance. Governor Curtin referred to the area as "sacred grounds." Within two months, the significance of Cemetery Hill, which had been so pivotal in the battle, had grown tremendously.

After the purchase of the land, plans for the Soldier's National Cemetery moved ahead. Wills hired William Saunders to landscape the grounds; the surveying was completed; a contract for the reburial of the remains was awarded; and the arrangements of the graves were finalized. It was decided that the dead would be reburied by state, each being assigned a separate lot. The size of the lots was determined by the number of troops each state lost. This plan, when completed, would represent one of the central messages the cemetery attempted to convey: the idea of equality.

As during the battle, the topography of Cemetery Hill heavily influenced the creation and meaning of the Soldiers National Cemetery, William Saunders explained:

"The surface was somewhat undulating, some high....but others low and inferior in comparison, so that in distributing the interments by States some would, of necessity, be placed in the lower portions and thus an apparently unjust discrimination might be inferred."

Saunders solved this problem by laying out the state sections in a semi-circular arrangement. On the highest ground in the cemetery there would be a central monument. Thus Saunders stated,"....the position of each lot, and indeed of each interment, is relatively of equal importance." Further stressing the equality theme was the determination to bury the officers and enlisted men side by side, an uncommon practice in the nineteenth century.

At the same time, Wills and the committee turned their attention to planning the "proper consecration of the grounds." Because the project had been planned and financed by the states, the dedication ceremony would naturally emphasize their role. The date of the ceremony was set for November 19, 1863. Edward Everett of Massachusetts, one of the great orators of that time, was invited to present the principal dedication address.

President Abraham Lincoln, although he did not receive an official invitation until November 2, was asked by Wills to "participate in these ceremonies...." In this letter to Lincoln, the Pennsylvania state agent wrote:

"It is the desire that, after the Oration, You as Chief Executive of the Nation formally set apart these grounds to their sacred use by a few appropriate remarks."

Far from being an afterthought or snub to Lincoln, the lateness of the invitation stressed instead the secondary role of the Federal government in the project.

Having shaped the Battle of Gettysburg and then being chosen as the site for the burial ground for the Union dead, Cemetery Hill would shortly thereafter take on an even more significant aspect. During the dedication ceremonies for the Soldier's National Cemetery, one of the famed speeches in world history would be given on its slopes

An in-depth discussion of "The Gettysburg Address" and its far ranging impacts could and has filled volumes. Obviously the speech is a masterpiece of both language and substance.

Lincoln was able to convey an incredible amount of information and meaning with his relatively short address. The speech was a rededication. Far from being simply a dedication ceremony, Lincoln saw the ceremony at Gettysburg as an opportunity to rededicate the nation to finishing the war.

The "Address" gave meaning to the deaths of the soldiers, not only in helping to save the Union, but also in making the country even better, or what Lincoln called giving a "new birth of freedom." The war would not only affirm the Constitution but also improve it by guaranteeing equality to everyone.

The speech put the country and the conflict on a world scale, for Lincoln saw the Civil War as a test of democracy. He reminded his audience "our fathers" had created a "new nation, conceived in Liberty." Now a "great civil war" was "testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived, and so dedicated, can long endure." He realized and alluded to the fact that other countries were closely monitoring the outcome of the struggle. He said: "The world will little note, nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here."

Most important, Lincoln's "Gettysburg Address" would eventually affect how the country perceived itself. Gary Wills' book,Lincoln at Gettysburg, probably best stated this idea:

"Lincoln is here not only to sweeten the air of Gettysburg, but to clear the infected atmosphere of American history itself, tainted with official sins and inherited guilt. He would cleanse the Constitution....He altered the document from within, by appeal from its letter to the spirit....By implicitly doing this, he performed one of the most daring acts of open air sleight-of- hand ever witnessed by the unsuspecting."

In effect, Lincoln attempted to change the very meaning of the nation as defined by the Constitution, which established a system of government, to a nation also defined by the Declaration of Independence, a document founded on the base principal of equality, at least, for white males. Amazingly Lincoln accomplished this with the first sentence of his speech:

"Fore score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal."

Gary Wills claimed that Lincoln did even more:

"The Gettysburg Address has become an authoritive expression of the American spirit--as authoritive as the Declaration itself, and perhaps even more influential, since it determines how we read the Declaration. For most people now, the Declaration means what Lincoln told us it means, as a way of correcting the Constitution itself without overthrowing it. It is this correction of spirit, this intellectual revolution, that makes attempts to go back beyond Lincoln to some earlier version so reckless...By accepting the Gettysburg Address, its concept of a single people dedicated to a proposition, we have been changed. Because of it, we live in a different America."

These multiple meanings are what give the "Gettysburg Address" its power and make the site of its deliverance so sacred.

Although it had already been dedicated, the Soldier's National Cemetery itself was not completed until March 1864 when the last of the 3,512 Union dead were reburied. Further improvements continued throughout the war, including the construction of enclosures, the carving of proper headstones, and the completion of William Saunders' landscaping plan. The November 7, 1865 Adams Sentinel reported a heavy force of workmen were "...still employed at the National Cemetery...The various avenues were laid out, and the work of macadamization on some parts of them is completed. The trees and shrubbery are being planted as fast as the progress of the work will admit. The headstones are all laid out in those sections where the bodies are buried. The balance...will be done in a short time to carry out the full design. The grounds are beginning to present a most handsome appearance, and in the course of a few years will be unsurpassed in beauty by any other spot in the world. This great has given employment to a great number of laborers, among whom we are pleased to notice a large number of returned soldiers. Probably some fought upon the very ground they are now helping to beautify."

Within two years of the battle, Cemetery Hill and the Soldier's National Cemetery located near its crest had taken on huge significance for these men.

This perception was soon held by the nation as a whole. As an example, in 1868 the tradition of holding special Decoration Day as ceremonies in the cemetery had begun. These ceremonies usually included a parade through town, the laying of flowers or small flags on all the headstones by local children, followed by a formal speech. By the late 1870's, some of the principal speakers were of national prominence, including four presidents and two vice-presidents. These same ceremonies continue today, more than 125 years later.

The 1869 dedication of the Soldier's National Monument, located at the center of the semi-circle of graves, also marked and encouraged a significant national trend. Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, the victor of the battle, in delivering his dedicatory remarks used the site and hill as a national platform to encourage reconciliation:

"When I contemplate this field, I see here and there marks of hastily dug trenches in which repose the dead against whom we fought....Above them a plank indicates simply that these remains of the fallen were hurriedly laid there by soldiers who met them in battle. Why should we not collect them in some suitable place?....In all civilized countries it is the usage to bury the dead with decency and respect, and even to fallen enemies respectful burial is accorded in death. I earnestly hope that this suggestion may have some influence throughout our broad land, for this is only one of a hundred crowded battle fields."

Throughout the years, Cemetery Hill continued to be involved in every changing shape of the battlefield. Although already nationally significant, the Soldier's National Cemetery "officially" became national in 1872, with a transfer of control to the United States War Department. Thus, the first Federal presence at Gettysburg involved the hill. The first veterans' reunions in the late 1870's and throughout the 1880's were held on East Cemetery Hill. The first official monument, a flower urn dedicated to the dead of the 1st Minnesota Infantry, was located on a hill in the Soldier's National Cemetery.

The cemetery itself took on a more important physical role as burials from other wars, including the Spanish-American War, World War I, and World War II, filled its grounds. In fact, so many new graves were added that additional land was purchased to create a National Cemetery Annex in 1948. With the further addition of the Korea and Vietnam dead, the remains of more than 7,000 Americans rest today within the cemetery's boundaries.

Today, more than 130 years after the great events enacted upon its slopes, Cemetery Hill has not only retained its original significance, but has taken on a higher meaning, both for the nation and the world. The site continues to serve as a national platform. For example, On November 19, 1990, during the annual Dedication Day ceremonies held in the Soldier's National Cemetery, the principal speaker, Jack Kemp, Secretary of HUD, touched upon the global significance of Gettysburg:

"It is with special purpose that we return to this sacred site...A hymn of freedom is now resounding in an ever-rising chorus from around the globe. On the eve of a new century and a new millennium, people all over the world bear witness to the revelation of this battlefield...."

Gettysburg and Cemetery Hill also has, and will continue to be, a defining focal point of national identity. During the 1989 Dedication Day ceremonies, New York Governor Mario Cuomo used the hill as a site for national rededication:

"The fact that we are returning here to this hallowed ground-- reminding ourselves of division, and the limitless possibilities of ideas--is 'altogether fitting and proper...This shrine can bring us the inspiration we need to bring our own stumbling efforts a sharper vision, a deeper compassion, a greater strength ....And because we understand today, just as Lincoln understood then, that the task of realizing this dream is still--as he expressed it--'unfinished work.' A grand work not finished by war, or the peace that followed, or the century and a quarter of incredible progress since.

'It is us, the living,' Lincoln said, 'to [be here dedicated to the] great task remaining before us.'

That task remains before us still."

Cemetery Hill has played an influential role in the long and constantly changing history of Gettysburg National Military Park. The hill has been a vital terrain feature that shaped the tide of fighting and the final outcome of the bloodiest battle waged in the Western Hemisphere, to a sacred burial ground to honor the sacrifice of all American service men and women throughout the nation's many conflicts, to the site of the deliverance of the "Gettysburg Address," the most heralded speech in American, if not world history.

It is therefore easy to understand why this "hallowed ground" rapidly became so important to the nation's conscience. The fact was made clear in the first official history of the Soldier's National Cemetery. Published in 1865, just two years after the battle and within months of the end of the war, it is obvious that the cemetery and the hill itself had already become an honored and sacred place. In part this history reads:

"Such was the origin of this final resting place for the remains of our departed heros, who nobly laid down their lives, a sacrifice on their country's altar....the place where they now lie will be honored, protected and preserved...."

Just as the same history stated, Cemetery Hill has truly became..."A field made glorious."

Copyright © 1995, Don Harvey, Revised 10 July 1996