[Editor's note: The following three mini-talks were part of a "The Day The North Won" topic for the October 1963 meeting of the Cincinnati CWRT]

The door began to close on the chances for Southern victory on April 19, 1861, five years before Appomattox, for on that day President Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of the six Southern states which had seceded. Eight days later this was extended to make the blockade of the South complete--from Cape Henry in Virginia to the Mexican border; four thousand miles of coast line.

And so began, only five days after the evacuation of Fort Sumter, the blockade; the event which, more than any other, decided the eventual outcome of the Civil War.

Ineffective at first, with only Key West and Pensacola for bases south of Hampton Roads, the blockade became tighter and tighter, strangling the south in its wooden walls. One by one Southern ports fell before Northern expeditions -- Port Royal, Fort Pulaski, New Orleans, Mobile -- and with each Northern occupation the blockade became a little tighter. At last only Wilmington, North Carolina was left east of the Mississippi. Lee, at Petersburg, notified the commander at Fort Fisher that the loss of Wilmington was the loss of Richmond and so it proved. Five days after the fall of Fort Fisher and the completion of the blockade, Richmond fell and the march to Appomattox began.

Just how did the blockade make the primary contribution to Northern victory? How did the small home squadron of twelve vessels swell to at last choke the Confederate South was primarily an agricultural section, her resources consisting mainly of raw materials. Her factories were few and completely inadequate for the needs of a major war. The timber for Confederate ships still stood on her forest covered slopes. The iron she needed was scarce, still buried in the mines. There were few furnaces or work shops. Even the hemp required for rope had to be grown and reaped, and there was no ropewalk. The Southern states had never produced enough iron for the purposes of their people during the time of peace and now that the war was to multiply the uses of that indispensable metal, the prices rose from $25 to $1,500 per ton in the deflated currency that later prevailed. Neither money nor industry could supply the demands of the navy, the army and the fast wearing rails and engines of the Southern railroads.

Tredegar Iron Works

In the whole of the South except for the Tredegar Iron Works and the Belona Foundry at Richmond, there was not a single rolling mill capable of turning out a 2 1/2" iron plate or a machine shop that could build a complete marine engine. Indeed many think that, in defending Richmond, the Army of Northern Virginia, was defending the Tredegar Iron Works, not the Confederate capital!

At first, while the blockade was hardly more than a paper proclamation, while the North was working desperately to build sufficient ships for the task, the South, in effect, blockaded itself! During those months of comparative quiet and preparation the Confederacy could have sold, delivered and stored in Europe enough cotton to supply the wants of European manufacturers for years. In exchange she could have bought arms and equipment. Instead an embargo was placed on the sale of cotton by the Confederate government.

The basic reason for this action was that the foreign policy of the Confederacy was composed mostly of delusions. They were glittering to Southern politicians and plausible. That policy, in brief, was this: the North needs cotton, the mills of Lancashire in England were starving for the stuff; France and Europe needed it badly also. Therefore, why not hold cotton off the world market until the need for it reached a critical stage? The result would be a fantastic increase in price and intervention by England and France in order to obtain the cotton they so badly needed.

There was however, no world cotton shortage. In the years before 1861 Southern cotton crops had been unusually large. The world carry-over was so immense that the cotton shortage did not develop until late in 1862. By this time the blockade was effective enough so as to prevent anything close to the amount of foreign trade the South so vitally needed. From then on the pressure became greater until, with the fall of Fort Fisher, the Confederacy started its death gasps.

The Confederacy struggled vainly to break the blockade that was slowly closing down upon her. Ironclads, "Hunley's," Blockade Runners, were all attempted and failed. Although perhaps half of the Blockade Runners were successful in their attempt to enter Southern ports, still their number was so few that the machinery, munitions, and supplies that they brought was never sufficient.

Suppose there had been no blockade. Would the Southern armies have been able to supply themselves after Bull Run and march into Washington? With more powerful engines from England, would Southern ironclads have been able to bombard Northern cities? With imported locomotives, rails and rolling stock, would the foodstuffs rotting in Georgia fields be brought North to Lee's hungry soldiers? With interior lines of communications and with a transportation system paid for with unrestricted seaports, would the South have been able to move armies from one front to another to concentrate on a Northern army as they did once at Chickamauga? With Lee's army well clothed and shod by imported goods, would there have been a clash at Gettysburg that led to a battle no one wanted? With a free flow of medicine would the Southern soldier have been able to do even greater deeds -- would the sharpshooter be able to be more accurate without suffering from malaria shakes? What could the Southern armies have done with better rifles, cannon? The superb Confederate cavalry -- would it have been better with breech-loading, repeating carbines and better accoutrements?

There was, however, a blockade, and little of these came to be. This is why, in my belief, the North won the war on April 19, 1861 when President Lincoln signed the blockade proclamation.

I. Preliminary Background
(a) Presidential Setting.

Robert Anderson

After Lincoln's election in 1860, and after his assumption of office in 1861, all evidence points to the fact that Lincoln wanted to preserve the status quo. He wanted, most of all, time. He sent his Illinois friend, Ward hill Lamon, to Charleston to observe the situation at the seaport and to report back to him. South Carolina Governor Francis W. Pickens and U.S. Major Robert Anderson both gathered the impression that the intentions of the North were to evacuate Fort Sumter. Again, in Lincoln's inaugural address, he did not comment as to any action to be taken on previous seizures by the South of Federal strongholds or properties. Ex-President Buchanan had not treated these seizures as acts of war. After that, to preserve the status quo, a relief expedition must be sent to Fort Sumter to supply food to the garrison's nearly exhausted stores. Fort Sumter presented to Lincoln a most portentous complication: He wanted time, but here, time was working in the interest of the Rebellion. General Scott and most of the Cabinet advised against a relief expedition, having determined the Fort should be evacuated. Major Anderson agreed with this thinking. Military Counsel was to the effect that it should be evacuated and the Forts in the Gulf strengthened.

(b) Chronological Setting at Charleston Harbor.

In 1858 and 1859, yellow fever was rampant each summer in Charleston. An ordnance sergeant had died of yellow fever in the summer of 1859, he, his wife and two children being the sole occupants of the island, Ft. Sumter. Fort Moultrie, a mile distant, where the Army was garrisoned, was also ravaged by the disease that year. The latter part of 1859, the War Department sent the commandant of Fort Moultrie, Colonel John L. Gardner, a directive to the effect that he could, at his discretion, remove the garrison to Smithville, North Carolina, should yellow fever break out in 1860. Fort Moultrie was the only one of three Fortifications, protecting Charleston, which was garrisoned. Since no yellow fever occurred in 1860, Colonel stayed at Fort Moultrie. Thus, a garrison was handy to occupy Fort Sumter after South Carolina seceded in December 1860.

John B. Floyd

By 1860, Ft. Moultrie was in a deplorable condition. Ft. Sumter was little more than an unfinished hollow square without armaments. But, this neglect might be justified by the fact the U.S. was at peace with the world. Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, a secessionist, recognizing the need for harbor fortifications at Charleston, ordered the two Forts put in good repair, anticipating their occupancy by the South as soon as secession was accomplished. Floyd managed this under a guise of disturbed relations between England and the United States. By November, Fort Sumter had 70 guns, equipment, shot, shell and 40,000 pounds of powder. The Fort was designed for 650 men manning 146 guns. At this time, Major Anderson saw his stength of masonry and guns increase, but not his manpower. On the night of December 26, six days after South Carolina seceded, Anderson loaded his garrison into three barges and trasferred it to Fort Sumter. Now, South Carolina could not possess itself of the Fort without an armed attack. Anderson had acted on previous War Department orders allowing him to occupy any of hte Forts according to his judgment. Anderson would not have occupied Ft. Sumter had not secessionist Floyd fortified it. The three barges had eluded two Confederate Gun boats to reach the Fort. Unexplainably one gunboat never left her wharf at Charleston that evening.

Governor Pickens ordered the Fort shut-off from supplies. In January, 1861, the Star of the West made an ineffectual attempt to provision the isolated Fort. Shortly thereafter, due to fear that Major Anderson could close the harbor by use of his batteries or that starvation of the garrison would arouse sympathy for the soldiers, Pickens' order was reversed. Major Anderson would not accept free provisions from Charleston authorities, but did agree to purchase provisions. However, the 42 women and children were removed by the Charleston authorities to Ft. Johnson, a relative place of safety. By special arrangement, Anderson purchased his provisions in Charleston until April 1861. Now, the Federal relief expedition was on its way, and Confederate General Pierre G.T. Beauregard, commanding Charleston Harbor, was ordered to end communications with the Fort. Shortly thereafter, Fort Sumter was cut off from the Charleston markets for the first time since January. Beauregard had given Anderson six days of grace before that order was enforced. Ft. Sumter would have been abandoned, had not this extra time been granted, before the arrival of the Federal fleet. Imagine the situation had the Federal fleet been allowed to arrive safely, and found the garrison prosaically drawing provisions from Charleston.

II. The Battle of Fort Sumter

Batteries on Ft. Johnson were the first to bombard the Fort. Then the rest of the guns, including floating batteries, blasted her. This became the spot where the showdown came. This was the only remaining spot in the Palmetto State where the Stars and Stripes still flew. Anderson would not surrender on demand; but would continue to hold out until ordered to evacuate by the Secretary of the War or the President. Now, the South was going to get its victory "With Honor" -- by force; not a hollow victory by evacuation or starvation. Three hours after the first shot by the Confederates, Ft. Sumter responded. Captain Abner Doubleday fired the first answering round. Major Anderson instructed his officers only to fire on the batteries and forts, and not to fire on private property. The 56 year-old Anderson had eight officers, 68 noncoms and privates, eight musicians, and 43 laborers under his command.

The bombardment lasted 36 hours with 3,000 shells being fired at the Fort. The relief fleet had arrived, but had not steamed to Anderson's assistance. It rode at anchor outside the harbor's mouth. The ships did perform one service; they transported the exhausted soldiers back to New York. No causalities took place in the Fort during the battle. Ironically, during the saluting ceremony at the surrender, an gunner was killed and several men were wounded when a cannon exploded. It surrenders on April 13 and was evacuated on April 14, 1861.

III. Historical Consequences

"Why did that Green Goose Anderson go into Fort Sumter," was a quote of the times. Anderson's courage was an example to the United States Government and showed no Union weakness. The South had made the fatal move; this was the match that ignited the gunpowder and started the war. Now, came the recruiting and the drafting. This affair aroused both North and South to such a pitch that ordinary citizens seemed under a spell of Camp Meeting hysteria. Now, it was to develop into a war of logistics, and the North could better wage it. Therefore, once the die had been cast, the South could not at any point thereafter gain a relative advantage. The last of an old society (agricultural) must succumb to the new (industrial).

"Sing a Song of Sumter
A Fort in Charleston Bay
Eight and Sixty Bravemen
Watch there Night and Day.

(Northern Song)

In the final analysis the Civil War was won because the North was able to organize her tremendous industrial potential. The Northern economic superiority can easily be overestimated. In 1861 the Northern industrial potential was only that -- potential. The North was entirely unprepared for its transition to its wartime needs.

Two days after Lincoln's inauguration as President of a sluggish and seemingly disintegrating United States, Jeff Davis, on authorization from the Confederate Congress, issued a call for 100,000 volunteers for one year's military service. The Confederate army had been born. By mid April, 1861, 35,000 men were under arms; a force twice that large as the then existing U.S. Army.

By attacking and capturing Sumter, the South had thrown down the gauntlet. On April 15 the call went out for the Northern States to provide 75,000 militia for three months service. On April 17 Virginia seceded. By May 20 eleven states were in armed rebellion.

U.S. Army strength in early 1861 was 16,367 officers and men. The 198 line companies were so scattered as to preclude any mobilization in force. 183 were on the Western frontier and 15 distributed along the Canadian border and Atlantic coast. The militia was 3,000,000 strong on paper but was in fact a huge unorganized mob. The President could call the militia for three months' service only if the respective state governors acquiesced.

The U.S. Navy in 1861 consisted of a mere 90 wooden craft of various categories; many were sailing vessels others combining sail and steam. The Navy was scattered all over the world. Only 42 vessels were in commission. 12 of these -- 5 frigates and 7 sloops were comparatively new steam cruisers. In the home squadron only 4 of the 13 vessels lay in Northern waters. (Navy 1,300 officers -- 6,700 enlisted men).

Of 1.036 regular army officers, 286 went with the South. 322 of the 1300 U.S. Naval officer did likewise.

In the opening days of the War the Confederate government made a serious if not fatal miscalculation concerning cotton, which would have a permanently crippling effect on the South. The Northern blockade was not yet in effect. It would be many months before it would be. The European markets were open and all the military needs of the South could have been satisfied. Military goods could have been paid for in cotton. Action in the first few months of the war could have solved all of the Confederate equipment problems.

The South felt that England and France would intervene in order to secure cotton. In fact the South refused to export cotton at this time in order to insure Europe feeling the pressure. IN effect, it made the Union blockade effective until the Federal Navy could handle the job. The important thing is that at the very time she needed guns and equipment most, she was not getting them. Had the South possessed these military goods early in the War it is doubtful if the North could have matched her on the field of battle. Time was on the side of the Union. This point must be kept in mind when discussing Bull Run as the day the North won the War.

There has been much speculation as to whether the South could have captured Washington following the Battle of Bull Run. I will not dwell on this point but there seems to be some evidence to support the claim that with a little better planning and aggressive action the Capital could have been captured.

At a conference in September, Johnston recommended to President Davis that his 40,000 men in the Manassas area be reinforced by "seasoned soldiers" to 60,000 strength. This force then should be given sufficient supplies and ammunition and invade the North. Generals Beauregard and Gustavus W. Smith, his two corps commanders, concurred. But Davis turned the proposition down; he could not furnish reinforcements without "total disregard for the safety of other threatened positions." With Mr. Davis' decision went much of the fruits of victory won at Bull Run. In fact it is my belief that this timidity on the part of the Confederate President, which the historian Ropes terms a "serious, probably a very serious error," was the turning point in the war; a surrender of the initiative which would have been more costly had McClellan taken advantage of it.

We do know that Bull Run left the Union Capital in a state of panic and many 90-day minute men left for home.

The effect of this battle on the South can best be stated by quoting Jeff Davis when he said, "Members of Congress, notably the Vice President contended that the men should be allowed to go home and attend to their private affairs while there were no active operations, and that there was not doubt but that they would return whenever there was to be a battle."

General Johnston wrote to Davis that the victory had temporarily disorganized his army. "Everybody, officers and privates seem to think that he had fulfilled all his obligations to country - and that before attending to any further call of duty, it was his privilege to look after his friends, procure trophies, or amuse himself. It was several days after you left us before the regiments who really fought could be reassembled."

Another point to consider is the effect the battle had upon the stature of Robert E. Lee. On Sunday morning, July 21, President Davis took a special train to Manassas. Lee had wished to go but Davis felt it more important for him to remain in Richmond. It was the first time that Lee had experienced anguish over a battle from afar. Lee had played an important part in the victory. He had been responsible for the selection of the line taken up by Beauregard, and his judgment had directed the Confederate's concentration at Manassas. In a large part he fashioned the junction of the Beauregard and Johnston. The public, however, did not reflect upon the man behind the scenes. Beauregard became as popular in Virginia as he had been in South Carolina.- Johnston took the place that Lee occupied in the affection of the people of Virginia. Circumstances had denied Lee a share in the battle of Manassas. Instead of recognition, Lee was headed for dark days in Western Virginia. Had Lee been on the field at Manassas the events following the battle might well have been ones of action.

While Bull Run resulted in inaction on the part of the Confederation, it resulted in specific action in the North.

First - Lincoln proposes a plan of action. I will review a few of the important points proposed by Lincoln the day following Bull Run.

1. Planned blockade.
2. Drill and discipline of troops at Fort Monroe under Butler.
3. hold Baltimore with a gentle but firm hand.
4. Let the force now under Paterson, or Banks be strengthened, and made secure in its position.
5. Let Fremont push forward his organization in the West.
6. Reorganize the troops of Manassas.
7. Discharge 3 months men who do not desire to enter longer service.
8. Bring forward the new troops to be organized in and around Washington.
9. Seize and hold Manassas and Strasburg - secure an open line between Harper's Ferry and Strasburg.
10. Start a joint movement from Cairo to Cincinnati.

Many of these things could be done at once, for others it would take time. Lincoln, however, did provide a definite plan of action.

The last point to consider in support of the contention that the North won the war at Bull Run is the rise of McClellan.

Geo. B. McClellan was appointed to command of all troops in the vicinity of Washington arriving there six days after Bull Run. At the time he was hailed as the savior of the nation. His problem was simple in objective - stupendous in fact: to fortify the nations capital and, at the same time, build a field army. He found a disorganized rabble of discourage psuedo-soldiers; a rabble augmented by daily arrivals of volunteer recruits. All vestiges of discipline were vanishing; grog shops and bawdy houses replaced drill grounds.

But McClellan knew what to do and he did it. His provost guards swept the city clean, sparing neither the hellholes nor the gas-lit glittering bars of the fashionable hotels where officers were drowning their sorrow. He shook out existing units as one would shake a dusty jacket, and droves of ignorant and inefficient officers were swept into the dust bin.

He gathered about him an efficient staff. His engineers laid out a ring of forts about the capital. His regimental, brigade, division and corps commanders set about their reorganization and training. New volunteers, answering the call for 500,000 3-year enlistments - the call had gone out the very day Bull Run had been fought - were corralled on arrival into training camps apart from the other troops. Not until these green formations had learned military fundamentals would they join the cadres already formed. The discipline was rigid, the training grueling. The dashing new general seemed to be everywhere at once. His soldierly figure on a galloping black horse, with his glittering staff and smart cavalry escort pounding behind, all impinged on the eyes of every man in the ranks: here was a leader!

The Army of the Potomac grew from 50,000 in July to 168,000 in November and was destined to retain the brand "Made by McClellan" long after he had passed from command. McClellan created an army which would grow in stature - an army that would fight and in the end follow Grant to Richmond.

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